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Psychiatric and Chemical Dependency
Treatment of Minors: The Myth of





The involuntary treatment of individuals for mental health and
chemical dependency problems has generated considerable debate
and controversy. Questions concerning a state's right to forcibly treat
someone against his will, the circumstances and standards required
to invoke this treatment, the decision-making process to determine if
those standards have been met, consent, and the patient's rights
throughout this procedure have resulted in much litigation as well as
legislative activity.
Conflicting interests and the resulting controversy are even more
pronounced when the person subjected to the involuntary treatment
is a minor. The confinement of juveniles for treatment is an ex-
tremely complex and controversial issue. It is the focus of debate on
the part of policy makers, professionals, public interest groups, child
advocates, and the public at large. This debate has intensified as re-
cent data has become available indicating a sharp rise in admissions
for such treatment, primarily in private hospitals and free-standing
residential facilities.
Since minors, by the mere fact of their minority, are deemed to
be incompetent to consent to treatment (with some statutory excep-
tions), parents and guardians can consent for them, thus making the
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confinement "voluntary" although the person being confined has not
consented. This situation has resulted in the development of mental
health and chemical dependency placement procedures and treat-
ment programs for minors characterized by little supervision or judi-
cial review. Admission, consent, treatment, release, and the right to
refuse treatment are proper topics for legal inquiry. While these is-
sues have a clinical therapeutic dimension, they also involve legal
questions, statutory and constitutional rights, and social and public
policy concerns.
II. Trends in the Treatment of Juveniles
Statistical data on juvenile psychiatric and chemical depen-
dency inpatient treatment has been difficult to obtain because there
are no systematic national or state reporting requirements for admis-
sions to private hospitals and free-standing residential units. Recent
research is beginning to shed light on this topic, however, and pat-
terns and trends in admission and confinement that previously were
difficult to discover are beginning to emerge. Disturbingly, the data
now indicate that the number of juveniles being admitted for inpa-
tient psychiatric and chemical dependency treatment is increasing.
The statistics also reflect that juveniles tend to be admitted for less
serious diagnoses than adults, and that the average length of stay for
juveniles is much greater than for adults.
Nationwide, juvenile admissions to private psychiatric hospitals
have more than doubled since 1980.1 General hospitals also showed
an increase in psychiatric admissions, although the increase was sub-
stantially less; from 1971 to 1980, juvenile admissions rose 9%. Al-
though juvenile admissions to state and county mental hospitals de-
clined somewhat in the seventies,' the trend toward increased
inpatient hospitalization of minors for chemical use and mental
health problems is alarming and should be carefully examined.
An additional area of concern beyond the increasing numbers of
young people admitted to facilities is the primary diagnosis used as
the basis for confinement. In 1980, almost half of all juvenile psychi-
atric admissions to United States hospitals were for the two com-
bined categories of ICD-9-CM diagnoses s that the National Institute
1. Jackson-Beeck, Schwartz & Rutherford, Trends and Issues in Juvenile Confinement
for Psychiatric and Chemical Dependency Treatment, 10 INT'L J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 153,
157 (1987) [hereinafter Rutherford].
2. Juvenile admissions to state and county mental hospitals declined from 26,352 in
1971 to 16,612 in 1980. Id. at 157.
3. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH: HUMAN SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE - HEALTH
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of Mental Health calls "preadult" and "other nonpsychotic" disor-
ders. 4 These categories include adjustment reaction, emotional dis-
turbances of childhood and adolescence, conduct disorders, hyperac-
tivity, sexual deviation, unclassifiable depressive disorders,
developmental delays, physiological malfunctions arising from psy-
chological conditions, and other "special symptoms or syndromes,"
such as stammering, stuttering, tics, eating disorders, sleep disorders,
and bed wetting.
Research compiled by the Commission on Professional and Hos-
pital Activities (CPHA) indicates that only six percent of the adults
admitted for psychiatric care to general hospitals fell within the mis-
cellaneous category, which by CPHA's definition includes "special
symptoms and syndromes," conduct disorders, emotional distur-
bances of childhood and adolescence, developmental delays, hyperac-
tivity, and unclassifiable depressive disorders." However, twenty-nine
percent of the juveniles admitted fell into this miscellaneous cate-
gory.6 For adults, only eight percent were admitted to CPHA's gen-
eral hospitals for adjustment/stress reaction as compared to twenty-
one percent of juveniles.7
Equally disturbing is a comparison of the average lengths of
stay between juveniles and adults. Juveniles stay longer for all major
psychiatric diagnoses in general hospitals.6 Juveniles' average length
of stay for adjustment/stress reaction exceeds that of adults admit-
ted for the same diagnosis by approximately one week." The average
length of stay for neurotic depression and miscellaneous mental dis-
orders is over three weeks for juveniles, but less than eleven days for
adults. 10 A similar pattern is evident in the area of chemical depen-
dency. Juveniles are admitted to general hospitals for chemical de-
pendency treatment with less precise diagnoses, yet their average
length of stay exceeds that of adults."
CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (ICD-9-CM) INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DIs-
EASES, CLINICAL MODIFICATION (9th Rev. Sept. 2, 1980). The ICD-9-CM is designed for the
classification of morbidity and mortality information for statistical purposes and for indexing
hospital records by disease and operations for data storage and retrieval. It is required for
reporting diagnoses and diseases to all U.S. Public Health Service and Health Care Financing
Administration programs.
4. Rutherford, supra note I, at 156.
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In Minnesota, although the number of hospital beds declined by
approximately fifteen percent, admissions for psychiatric and chemi-
cal dependency treatment to Twin Cities hospitals increased, partic-
ularly among adolescents.1 2 The average length of stay also became
longer for young persons, but not for adults."3 One major insurer
found the equivalent of fifty-five years of unnecessary inpatient care
for juveniles and adults since 1981.1"
The research, therefore, shows a trend toward increasing hospi-
talization for juveniles. With diagnoses that are somewhat vague and
ill-defined and lengths of stay that exceed those of adults, serious
questions arise as to the appropriateness of the present system of
"voluntary" admission that provides for little supervision and review
while allowing others, chiefly parents and mental health profession-
als, to consent to the confinement of juveniles. Moreover, although
hospitalization of young people for psychiatric and chemical depen-
dency treatment is on the rise, a real question remains as to the effi-
cacy of such treatment for minors. A study conducted by the Office
of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress found that
there was no systematic study of the effectiveness of psychiatric hos-
pitalization for treating childhood mental disorders. The study found
that "available studies do not clearly show which components of hos-
pital treatment contribute to successful outcomes. Neither do they
allow conclusions about whether children treated as hospital inpa-
tients would have been better, worse, or [had] similar outcomes with
non-hospital treatment."' 5
III. Case Studies
Statistical information alone does not convey the seriousness of
the issue presented by this largely unregulated and unmonitored sys-
tem. A few case histories will serve to illustrate some of the con-
cerns. The following case histories are taken from Peer Review De-
terminations completed by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota as
part of their Effective Care Program. 6 The Effective Care Program
was instituted in order to undertake a focused study of utilization
12. Id. at 154.
13. Id.
14. Flygare, Civil Commitment of Juveniles - Available Facilities and Funds in Plac-
ing Kids in Treatment - Who Has What Rights? 1986 ADVANCED LEGAL EDUC., HAMLINE
U. [hereinafter Flygare].
15. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA-BP-H-33), Children's
Mental Health: Problems and Services - A Background Paper (December 1986).
16. Flygare, supra note 14, at 3.
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issues and to determine the medical necessity of inpatient versus out-
patient care for psychiatric and chemical dependency treatment.
The first case involves a fourteen-year-old female who was ad-
mitted with a diagnosis of adjustment reaction. Her length of stay
was eighty-five days. Her discharge diagnosis was adjustment reac-
tion mixed with depression. The case summary is as follows:
This fourteen-year-old female was admitted to an inpatient ado-
lescent psychiatric program for persistent conflict between herself
and her mother. The specific incidents that brought her to the pro-
gram involved staying out all night without telling her mother and
arguments over rules and conduct at home. The peer reviewers found
that there was no justification for the admission. There was no evi-
dence that the girl had serious mental health problems requiring hos-
pitalization, that she was a danger to herself or others, or that outpa-
tient services had been exhausted. The peer review further revealed
that there were no clear-cut behavioral goals established for the pa-
tient and that she exhibited no serious behavioral disorders while
hospitalized. The girl was angry and dissatisfied living with her
mother, but she exhibited no behaviors justifying inpatient treat-
ment. Hospital records indicate that the patient was discharged
"prematurely" after eighty-five days because her insurance ran out.
After reviewing the case, Blue Cross Blue Shield allowed pay-
ment for seven days of assessment and evaluation. The hospital did
not receive payment for seventy-eight days of this particular pa-
tient's care, an amount that was over $28,000.17
The second case involves a fifteen-year-old female who was ad-
mitted to a hospital with a diagnosis of atypical conduct disorder
with depression. She was confined in the hospital's inpatient psychi-
atric program for seventeen days. The case summary reads as
follows:
This fifteen-year-old female was admitted to an inpatient ado-
lescent psychiatric program for running away, truancy, and failure
to obey rules at home. The patient also has a twenty-two-year-old
boy friend. Upon peer review of the case, reviewers found that all
data in the medical records indicated truancy as the reason for ad-
mission. The patient had been exhibiting these symptoms for over
three years with no danger to self or to others, and outpatient treat-
ment was never attempted. Peer review found that inpatient treat-
ment was not justified and allowed seven days for evaluation. It re-
17. Id. at 39, 40.
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1988
fused to pay for the remaining ten days of confinement.18
Finally, in a case involving alcohol/drug dependency, a seven-
teen-year-old male was admitted for inpatient treatment and re-
mained for thirty-nine days. His admitting diagnosis was drug de-
pendency. The case summary reads as follows:
This seventeen-year-old male was admitted for inpatient treat-
ment based on excessive use of alcohol and marijuana. Peer review-
ers determined that there was no need for residential treatment in
this case. The patient's chemical use was not truly excessive, and he
did not appear to be seriously impaired. A slight drop in grades and
sibling fighting were present, but this behavior was not necessarily
related to chemical use. His previous success with out-patient treat-
ment and his superior intelligence should have enabled him to benefit
from outpatient treatment more easily than many others. Peer re-
viewers allowed seven days for assessment and evaluation. 9
These three cases alone resulted in 120 days of unnecessary hos-
pitalization. The cases are not unusual. They represent a disturbing
trend toward hospitalization of minors for what are essentially fam-
ily problems, relatively nonsevere emotional problems, and drug and
alcohol abuse. Although the kind of peer review undertaken by Min-
nesota Blue Cross and Blue Shield is helpful in examining unneces-
sary hospitalization, it is no substitute for recognizing that the per-
son who is to be the subject of this hospitalization should have the
right to consent to the treatment or withhold that consent. Post-
treatment review by the insurance company and disallowance of pay-
ment to the hospital is little comfort to the confined minor.
Confinement under the guise of medical care allows minors to
be deprived of liberty without any semblance of due process. Since
minors can no longer be confined to secure institutions in the juvenile
justice system for status offenses, psychiatric and chemical depen-
dency treatment facilities are becoming the new institution of
choice.20 Placing one's child in the mental health system instead of
18. Id. at 41.
19. Id. at 43.
20. The Juvenile Justice Act, passed in 1974, was an attempt at national juvenile justice
reform. The Act established the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Office as an
oversight agency to coordinate and oversee reform in participating states.
One of the standards with which the participating states must comply mandates that
states must develop programs that are designed to:
provide within three years of the submission of the initial plan that juveniles who
are charged with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if
committed by an adult or offenses which do not constitute violations of valid
court orders, or such non-offenders as dependent or neglected children shall not
be placed in secure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities.
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the juvenile justice system allows the confinement of that child to
occur without outside review and without due process protection for
the child. Since the law presently views such confinement as "volun-
tary," the due process protection normally associated with involun-
tary commitment is not applicable. Thus, the expansion of the medi-
cal model in this context permits the deprivation of liberty under the
cloak of medical treatment.
It is useful to be reminded of the words of Justice Brandeis who
stated:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to pro-
tect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their lib-
erty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding. 1
IV. Treatment of Minors and the Age of Consent
Consent is the critical concept that must be addressed when ex-
ploring the treatment of minors. Consent in this context consists of
three elements: consent must be voluntary, knowing, and competent.
"Voluntary" encompasses the element of free choice; consent is not
present where there is the threat of force, coercion, duress, etc.
"Knowing" concerns the amount and quality of information that is
necessary to make an informed decision. "Competent," the most dif-
ficult element of consent, focuses on the level of cognitive functioning
necessary to give valid consent. Competency is defined differently in
different situations, for example, executing a will or signing a bind-
ing contract. Generally, however, a child is presumed to be incompe-
tent by the mere fact of his or her age unless the presumption is
overcome by marriage, adulthood, legal emancipation, or other stat-
utory provision.22
Historically, a child was a chattel of the parent with no separate
legal rights;22 therefore, a child cannot consent to treatment since
42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (1974). Section 5633(c) assures that "failure to achieve compli-
ance with the requirements of subsection (a)(12)(A) ...within the three year's time limita-
tion shall terminate any state's eligibility for funding under this subpart" unless the Adminis-
trator makes an exception due to substantial compliance.
21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1927).
22. F. ROZOVSKY. CONSENT To TREATMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1984) [hereinafter
ROZOVSKYJ.
23. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 436. "[E]very man has, or ought to have, by the
laws of society, a power over his own property; and as Grotius very well distinguishes, natural
right obliges to give a necessary maintenance to children; but what is more than that, they
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1988
the child does not have the legal capacity to consent. In addition to
the notion that a child is the property of the parent with no separate
legal identity, the law views children as too inexperienced, immature,
and undeveloped to make decisions regarding treatment.2" Excep-
tions to this rule have evolved over time. Courts have found the mi-
nor capable of giving consent for treatment in emergency situations,
where the minor is emancipated or mature.25
Many states have also enacted legislation that recognizes that a
minor who is emancipated can consent to treatment. 26 Emancipation
may be determined from a number of criteria, including marriage by
the minor, giving birth to a child, or living apart from one's family
and being financially independent.2 7 Some states have also codified
the mature minor exception to the general rule that minors are una-
ble to consent to treatment.28 Moreover, many states have passed
legislation that authorizes minors to consent to treatment for specific
illnesses or conditions. The most common conditions for which mi-
nors can consent to treatment include pregnancy, venereal disease,
and drug and alcohol abuse.29
It was not until 1967 that the modern notion that children are
protected by the constitution and have constitutional rights was
clearly articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the case
of In re Gault.30 A child is not beyond the protection of the Consti-
tution merely because he is a minor. The Court also stated in a 1976
decision that "constitutional rights do not mature and come into be-
ing magically only when one attains the state defined age of major-
ity. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights.""1
Although courts have now taken the view that children possess
certain rights, those rights are not coextensive with the rights of
have no other right to, than as it is given them by the favour of their parents, or the positive
constitutions of law." Id.
24. See Oliver v. Houdlet, 13 Mass. 237 (1816). "In all cases, the benefit of the infant is
the great point to be regarded; the object of the law being to protect his imbecility and indis-
cretion from injury, through his own imprudence, or by the craft of others." Aristotle, POLIT-
ics 32-33, 316; "The law's concept of the family rests on the presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience and capacity for judgment required for making
life's difficult decisions." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
25. RozovsKY, supra note 22, at § 5.2.
26. Id. at § 5.31.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Pilpel, Minor's Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462 (1972); Wadlington,
Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, II OSGOODE HALL LJ. 115 (1973).
30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967).
31. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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adults. The Supreme Court, distinguishing between the scope of the
rights of adults and the rights of children, relies on three reasons to
constrict the full panoply of rights from application to minors. First,
the unique role of the family in our society serves as the basis for
flexibility and particular sensitivity in applying constitutional rights
to minors. Second, children have a peculiar vulnerability due to their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner.
Third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing justifies,
in the Court's view, a limitation on the rights of children. 2
In discussing the specific issue of decision-making by minors,
the Supreme Court held:
. . . the States validly may limit the freedom of children to
choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative
choices with potentially serious consequences. These rulings
have been grounded in the recognition that, during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the expe-
rience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them.83
Thus, while the Supreme Court has recognized that minors have
certain rights based on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the
extent of those rights is not clear. Competing interests of the family
and the view that minors do not have the capability of making in-
formed intelligent decisions have led the Court to limit a minor's
rights. The exact nature and extent of that limitation, however, is
not clear.
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court decided the leading
case dealing with the commitment of minors for mental health treat-
ment.34 The statutory scheme in question permitted voluntary com-
mitment of children under the age of eighteen to state mental hospi-
tals upon the application of a parent or guardian. Upon such
application, the superintendent of the hospital was authorized to ad-
mit a minor for observation and diagnosis. If, after diagnosis and
observation, the superintendent concluded that the minor was men-
tally ill and suitable for treatment in the hospital, the minor could be
admitted for such a period and under such conditions as was author-
ized by law.
The statute's provisions also allowed the parent or guardian and
the superintendent control over when the minor would be discharged.
32. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
33. Id. at 635.
34. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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Any minor who had been hospitalized for more than five days could
be discharged upon the request of a parent or guardian. The superin-
tendent had an affirmative duty to release any minor who had recov-
ered from his mental illness or who had sufficiently improved to the
extent that hospitalization was no longer desirable.35 The plaintiff
class challenged this voluntary commitment process for children
under the age of eighteen on the grounds that it violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment."0
In analyzing the issue, the Supreme Court first articulated its
approach for testing state procedures under a due process claim. If
there is a protected liberty or property interest involved, the Court
balances three competing interests: 1) the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail. 37
The Court began by stating that it must first consider the
child's interest in not being committed. Rather than analyzing that
interest from the minor's individual perspective, however, the Court
declared that since the minor's interest is inextricably linked with
the parents' interest, the private interest at stake is a combination of
the child's and parents' concerns.38 This approach echoes the notion,
dating back to Blackstone and his predecessors, that children do not
have a legally recognized identity separate from their parents. The
Court does recognize that a child, like an adult, has a substantial
liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treat-
ment and that the state's involvement in the commitment decision
constitutes state action under the fourteenth amendment.39
Although the Court stated that it recognized a protectable in-
terest of a minor in being free from unnecessary restraints and erro-
neous labeling, it went on to subordinate those constitutional inter-
ests to the interests of parents. Relying on what it termed "Western
civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental au-
35. Id. at 590, 591.
36. Id. at 588.
37. Id. at 599, 600.
38. Id. at 600.
39. Id. The Court also recognized that commitment sometimes produces adverse social
consequences for the child because of the reaction of some persons to the discovery that the
child has received psychiatric care. However, the Court goes on to minimize the stigma that
might result from such treatment. Id. at 600, 601.
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thority over minor children," the Court justified diminishing the
rights of the minor by accepting the presumption that parents pos-
sess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment, all of which are required for making life's difficult
decisions.'
Along with the historically-based notion that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children,
the Court emphasized that, in its view, "[m]ost children, even in ad-
olescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning
many decisions, including their need for medical care or treat-
ment."'41 The Court concluded that parents retain a substantial if not
dominant role in the decision to commit, absent a finding of abuse or
neglect. Although parents cannot always exercise absolute and unre-
viewable discretion to decide to institutionalize a child, they retain
plenary authority to seek such treatment for their children, subject
to medical judgment.' 2
The Court further held that an inquiry by a neutral fact finder
is sufficient protection from an erroneous admission decision."3 More-
over, since this is a medical decision, a staff physician will suffice.
When the State acts on behalf of its ward for admission to a state
mental hospital, no different procedures are required. An indepen-
dent medical judgment after an investigation is an acceptable means
of justifying voluntary commitment." Thus, the Court minimized
the constitutional implications in confinement to an institution and
its resulting stigma by emphasizing the inability of minors to make
such decisions for themselves and by characterizing the process as a
medical one.
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, emphasized even
more explicitly the long-standing tradition that parents speak for
their children. 45 In Justice Stewart's view, when parents invoke vol-
untary admission procedures on behalf of their children, no state
40. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 602.
41. Id. at 603.
42. Id. at 604. See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), in which the Court
upheld preventive detention of juveniles. The Court held that while the juveniles' interest in
freedom from institutional restraint is substantial, that interest must be qualified by the recog-
nition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody and are not assumed to
have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of
their parents; and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae. In
this respect, the juvenile's liberty may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the
States "parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child." Id. at
265 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
43. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 606, 607.
44. Id. at 618.
45. Id. at 621.
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deprivation of liberty occurs." The constitution does not compel
state intervention between the parent and child. Justice Stewart ac-
cepts the presumption that minors are incapable of making treat-
ment decisions for themselves, and that parents act in the best inter-
ests of their children.47
This Supreme Court decision embodies the presumption that
minors are incapable of making treatment decisions for themselves.
This presumption comports with the long held common law principle
that children do not have a separate voice from that of their par-
ents.48 Nonetheless, this unexamined presumption is open to ques-
tion. Psychological and cognitive research suggests that minors are
in fact capable of engaging in a reasoned and thoughtful decision-
making process.
V. Minors' Consent-A Cognitive View
The Supreme Court based its decisions limiting minors' rights
on the notion that adolescents do not have the capability of making
informed, intelligent decisions because of their age. It is therefore
critical to examine the research that has been done in this area. Sim-
ply put, the question to be examined is whether there is, in fact, an
empirical basis for the Court's reliance on this traditional view of
minors' lack of maturity and their presumed cognitive limitations.
Several of the cognitive capacities that are required for consent,
such as abstract reasoning, inductive and deductive logical processes,
and cognitive complexity, correspond with the capacities that Piaget
associated with the emergence of the formal operations stage of cog-
nitive development.49 Piaget's theory of cognitive development in
children posits a series of stages through which a child passes, with
each subsequent stage representing a higher level of comprehension
and achievement. First appearing during early adolescence, the for-
mal operations stage includes the development of an increased cogni-
tive capacity to bring certain operations to bear on abstract concepts
in problem-solving situations.50 Piaget and subsequent researchers
46. Id. at 623.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 621. See also I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 436, supra note 23.
49. J. PIAGET, INTELLIGENCE AND AFFECTIVITY 69 (Brown ed. 1981). The last stage of
intellectual development is that of the formal operations. It begins around eleven or twelve and
attains equilibrium around fourteen or fifteen. It is during this stage that the capacity for
hypothetic-deductive reasoning first appears. Id.
50. Id. "Henceforth, intelligence will be able to operate not only on objects and situa-
tions but also on hypotheses and, therefore, on the possible as well as on the real. Formal
operations are not concerned only with operations on classes and relations as the concrete
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have noted the age range of eleven to thirteen as a period for the
appearance of thought that is characteristic of formal operations.51
If this research is accurate and minors begin to possess the cognitive
ability to consent in an intelligent manner near the age of twelve,
then the Supreme Court's reliance on the notion that minors are not
capable of such decision-making as a basis for its determination of
limited constitutional rights is called into question.
A review undertaken by Grisso and Vierling concludes that a
substantial percentage of minors have attained a stage of cognitive
development (formal operations) at age twelve that predominates in
the general adult population.52 If this is true, there is no justification
for denying to minors age twelve and older the same rights regarding
consent that are applied to adults. Admittedly, not all minors possess
the same cognitive abilities at the same age, so not all minors are
intellectually able to provide consent. Nonetheless, the same varia-
tions in ability apply to a random sample of the adult population and
there is no clear evidence that variation in ability is any greater in
adolescence than in adulthood.5"
Grisso and Vierling also review the research concerning the
ability of minors to comply with the voluntary element of consent.
Deference to authority and the need for conformity can affect
whether a minor's consent is truly voluntary. They conclude that the
likelihood of deferent responses to authority in order to avoid nega-
tive consequences is apparently great in the preadolescent years and
remains high in early adolescence. This deferential behavior is ac-
companied by an increased concern for social expectations.5 4 Thus,
while there is a greater tendency toward conformity in early adoles-
cence, this behavior diminishes by middle adolescence.
The research also suggests that minors fifteen and older possess
sufficient cognitive abilities and independence to make decisions that
are intelligent and voluntary. Therefore, no sound basis in fact sup-
operations were. They operate on propositions and involve implication, disfunction, etc. They
make possible for the content of reasoning to be dissociated from its form. To simple opera-
tions ... they add operations to the second power or operations on operations. This makes
reflection in the strict sense possible; it allows thought to turn upon itself." Id. at 69.
51. Grisso and Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 412 (1978) (citing B. INHELDER AND J. PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGI-
CAL THINKING (1958)) [hereinafter Grisso]; see also Elkind, Conceptional Orientation Shifts
In Children and Adolescents, 37 CHILD DEV. 493-498 (1966); Neimark and Lewis, Develop-
ment of Logical Problem Solving: A One-Year Retest, 39 CHILD DEv. 527-538 (1968); Webb,
Concrete and Formal Operations In 6 to 11 Year Olds, 17 HUM. DEv. 292-300 (1974).
52. Grisso, supra note 51.
53. Id. at 421.
54. Id. at 422, 423.
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ports the limited right of consent for those adolescents.
Minors between the ages of eleven and fourteen are more prob-
lematic. Cognitive abilities are in the developing stages during this
period. Although, it may not be reasonable to make a blanket state-
ment that all minors in this age range can give intelligent and volun-
tary consent, it is equally unreasonable to categorically deny that
right to all minors. There should be an individual determination of
competence for each minor in this age range.
Once it is accepted that minors, at least by the age of fifteen,
have the capacity to make informed decisions, to comprehend infor-
mation, and thus to give informed consent, the question then be-
comes whether minors can act on that information to protect their
rights. Theoretical understanding, without the ability to apply that
understanding in a meaningful way to protect one's rights and to
recognize when one's rights have been violated, provides little benefit
from a practical perspective.
Belter and Grisso conducted a study that examined whether in-
forming minors of their rights in a mental health setting would affect
their ability to recognize when a right had been violated and their
ability to take action to protect that right. They conducted the study
using three age groups. The mean ages of the groups were nine
years, one month; fifteen years, seven months; and twenty-one years,
nine months. The findings of the study indicate that the average fif-
teen-year old may be "quite capable of understanding rights and
forming ideas about protecting rights at a level that is equivalent to
most adults."55 While the authors caution against generalizing from
their population of "normal" white, middle-class males of average
intelligence to larger populations with different characteristics, it is
significant that the findings of this study parallel the previous re-
search regarding the capacity of minors to comprehend and act on
information regarding their rights. 6
Admittedly, more research must be done to further examine
these issues. The research that has been completed, however, sug-
gests that minors fifteen years of age and older have not only the
cognitive ability to comprehend information, but also the ability to
use that information in a practical manner to recognize a violation or
potential violation of their rights and to act in a way to protect those
55. Belter and Grisso, Children's Recognition of Rights Violations In Counseling, 15
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 899, 907 (1984) (hereinafter Belter].




The growing body of research in this field, which indicates that
older adolescents are capable of understanding their rights and of
providing informed consent, calls into question court decisions plac-
ing limitations on the rights of minors in this critical area. For rea-
sons that are not entirely clear, the Supreme Court has chosen to
ignore relevant research findings and has apparently based its assess-
ment of the maturity and capacity of minors on traditional, wide-
spread, and largely unsupported assumptions.
The failure to consider the relevant research on this topic con-
tributes to a situation in which minors are subject to a system of
enforced treatment without the legal capacity to either voluntarily
consent to or refuse such treatment. Since minors lack this legal ca-
pacity, others can consent for them. For minors, the consenting per-
son is usually a parent or legal guardian. Since the treatment of the
minor is accomplished through the consent of the parent or legal
guardian, the treatment is viewed as "voluntary" even though the
person subject to treatment has not consented. This fiction results in
a system of juvenile care and services that is undisturbed by inde-
pendent review or judicial oversight. It is a system in which minors
can be routinely confined without the benefit of due process or proce-
dural protections.
The increasing number of minors being hospitalized for psychi-
atric and chemical dependency treatment, coupled with the mount-
ing evidence suggesting that older adolescents are indeed capable
and competent to make informed decisions about their own treat-
ment, suggests that this issue should be placed high on the public
agenda. In particular, policy makers, health care professionals, child
welfare officials, child advocates, and public interest groups should
strive to develop policies "aimed primarily at differentiating children
who are truly dependent and in need of protection from those who
are essentially competent and should have their autonomy and pri-
vacy respected."15 7 For example, state lawmakers should seriously
consider enacting legislation affording minors fifteen years of age
and older the legal ability to consent or refuse consent to psychiatric
or chemical dependency treatment. Lawmakers should clarify that
state commitment statutes, which provide due process protection for
57. G. Melton, I. Schwartz, & M. Resnick, Emerging Legal Issues in Children's Health
Care, paper presented at Harvard School of Public Health (November, 1986).
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those persons judicially determined to be in need of involuntary
treatment, apply to minors.
State lawmakers, health care professionals, family and chil-
dren's law experts, and child welfare officials should also carefully
explore whether policies providing older adolescents the right to con-
sent to or refuse psychiatric or chemical dependency treatment need
to be coupled with reforms allowing youth independent access to
health care services on a confidential basis. Consideration should be
given to new and appropriate public and private options for financing
health care services as well.
VII. Conclusion
Providing psychiatric and chemical dependency treatment for
minors is extremely complex. A variety of interests are involved,
some in conflict. The issue is even further complicated by recent
studies indicating that minors, at least by the age of fifteen, possess
the intellectual and developmental capability to make important de-
cisions for themselves, particularly decisions regarding health care
treatment. 58
Historically, minors have been viewed as the property of their
parents. As a result, they have not possessed a separate legal voice
and were often deemed incompetent to make important decisions by
reason of their minority. State statutory schemes, as well as the com-
mon law, have carved out some exceptions to the general principle
that minors are incompetent to consent to treatment. Moreover,
treatment for certain conditions, such as venereal disease, pregnancy,
and chemical dependency, is sometimes permitted by statute to be
provided to minors based solely on the minor's consent.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the notion that
minors do, in fact, possess constitutional rights. The Court, however,
has not found those rights to be co-extensive with the rights of
adults. The Court has relied on the traditional notion that minors do
not possess the maturity and ability to make certain critical deci-
sions. Therefore, those decisions must be made for them by a parent
or guardian or an entity such as the state acting in the role of
parent.
These holdings have reinforced a system that views the hospital-
ization of minors for chemical dependency and/or mental health
treatment as voluntary hospitalization, even though the minor who is
58. Belter, supra note 55, at 21; Grisso, supra note 51, at 24.
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confined has not consented. This fiction of voluntariness allows for
the placement and confinement of youth in institutions without the
benefit of the kind of judicial review that would be required in an
involuntary commitment situation. The absence of appropriate court
review of these "voluntary" admissions essentially means that there
are no checks and balances within the system.
The trend toward increasing hospitalization of minors for
mental health and chemical dependency treatment is alarming.
Mounting research indicates that the traditional justification of the
incompetency of minors to make critical decision is in error. Simi-
larly, the implication that parent-child conflict may be a substantial
factor in hospitalization of minors should be carefully examined. In
light of these concerns, legislators, policy makers, health care profes-
sionals, and public interest groups should recognize that minors, par-
ticularly older adolescents, should be accorded the same legal status
as adults in this decision-making process and should be given suffi-
cient due process protection against inappropriate hospitalization.

